Abstract : the relations between Russia and China have become much warmer since the beginning of the 1990s ; they put an end to severe tensions between the two countries. Now trade is expanding, and investment from China in the border area is stimulating growth along the Amur River. But with growth also come water withdrawals : sortages have already appeared in the basin. Prospects are all the more problematic as northern China is facing severe water shortages that could partly be solved, in the medium term, by a derivation from the Amur/Heilongjiang Basin.
With the warming of relations between the two countries, trade expanded and economic growth began to alter the economic geography of the region. The then Russian side slipped into recession, the Chinese side witnessed an unprecedented economic boom. The Amur River border had become a trade gate between the two neighbours; most political and border issues were settled peacefully through a series of treaties.
It seems, however, that the new era of sino-russian relations is also tainted with suspicion and long-term fears. Growth and trade opportunities in the Amur area have attracted migrants to the area. Chinese immigration to the region is fuelling local Russian fears of a "creeping invasion" aimed at claiming the former Chinese territories back. At the government levels, relations are normalized and both sides have engaged in trade and security cooperation, but the relationship remains uneasy and tainted with long-term mistrust.
Could water sharing become an issue between Russia and China ? Growth, population expansion and agricultural development, especially on the Chinese side, have also brought about the expansion of water withdrawals, at a time when the water situation is worsening in the North China plain. Slow expansion, both industrial and agricultural, is unlikely to create water scarcity in the Russian Far East, but water demand on the Chinese side, coupled with a precipitation pattern that makes the region vulnerable to droughts, is becoming an issue. In the Amur Basin, a region where the water resource was considered infinite, scarcity is also becoming a problem, both locally and because the Amur Basin water is becoming coveted in other Chinese regions. Derivation projects have surfaced, conflicting uses of the Amur's water have emerged. A plan to rationalize the use of the Ussuri water has been set up, but seems to be failing to reach its objectives because of poor coordination between authorities.
The water issue in the border area between Russia and China stems mainly from the growing water scarcity in Northern China, a scarcity that has reached the point where officials openly mention water as a limitating factor to growth. At the same time, agriculture is still expanding in the Northeast, in particular with crops that require large amounts of water. Water from the Chinese side of the Amur basin (Map 1) is becoming caught between conflicting demands, local needs to expand agriculture so as to feed China, and demand from the North China plain where the rivers are running dry and water tables dropping fast.
Russian authorities have not published detailed hydrologic reports as to how water resource sharing could become a political issue with China. The scarcity of Russian figures does not mean, however, that authorities are not wary. They have already expressed their concern over low levels of water in the Amur river basinWith
Chinese plans for increased consumption in the Northeast, locally first, and with potential water exports in the longer term to quench an ever thirsty North China plain, are local water resources on the Chinese side sufficient to satisfy demand ? To what extent are growing water needs in Northeastern China going to affect the uneasy China-Russia relationship ? Although it is of course too soon to answer, it is nevertheless relevant to wonder if the fast increasing Chinese water demand, and the probable ensuing water sharing issue, could alter the present mutually beneficial ties between Russia and China, ties that have been forged not on common friendship, but against common adversaries.
Becoming a trading border... The Amur as a gate between Russia and China
Russia as well as China had strong reasons for improving relations. China could alleviate the military pressure on its northern border and engage in military and technological co-operation with Russia, at a time when the United States began to be more sensitive about transferring high-technology know-how to China. As for Russia, it could then concentrate on the enormous internal challenges implied by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the economy. Rapprochement is not so much a response to NATO enlargement, as Russian policies since September 11 attest to :
Russia was quick in accepting, in May 2002, the setting up of a joint NATO-Russia agreements during the 1960s with its neighbours, so as to erase the memories of border agreements that were inherited from the colonial era. 16 However, the migration pressure might become too strong for China to control, especially as agricultural production faces severe challenges in North China, as will be seen below : fertile farmland and available water, the crisis of agricultural production on the Russian side of the Amur that sends foodstuff prices skyrocketing, the need for labour force, ample timber, gold deposits make the region attractive for settlers from China.
Opening new agriculture fronts is already a priority in Chinese plans, because of the severe water problem in Northern China. 17 In the medium-term, it could also be that China could seriously consider the derivation of water from the 
Water transfers within China
The only solution, according to Chinese planners, apart from drastic measures to cut down on rural water use, or massive and costly investment in water-efficient irrigation techniques, is diversion of water from elsewhere. , vol.5, nº2, 1995, pp.78-82. that the western route is utterly unrealistic, 31 while other insist China cannot do without it in the medium to longer term, given the water deficit that will develop in Northern China (Map 4)
The gigantic engineering project diverting water from upper, middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi, would alleviate to a certain extent water scarcity in the north, especially in the short term. However, some officials have hinted at the idea it is the acuteness of the drought crisis that had the government give the green light, in 
International watercourses derivation
The sheer scope of the western route envisioned for the Yangzi derivation had
Chinese scientists underline its poor feasibility or economic rationality, pointing to more practical derivation scheme in Northeastern China, especially in the East's territory, its basin covers an area of 1 855 000 sq. km (of which 933 000 sq. km lie on the Russian territory), and its mean annual flow is 346 cu. km. In terms of volume of water, the Amur River ranks fourth in Russia and follows the Yenisei, the In general terms, the Russian Far East has enough water resources for economic activity. There are 5 times more water reserves per capita here than Russia's average. But this figure is misleading. The least per capita index is registered on Sakhalin and in Primorsky krai, the two most densely populated areas of the region.
There already is a real shortage of drinking fresh water in areas where the bulk of the region's population lives -in the south of Primorsky and Khabarovsky krais and in some areas of Sakha. This shortage is caused naturally by the freezing of rivers, during the winter time, and by usually dry springs and falls, 43 but is compounded by the growing demand on both sides of the river.
Water consumption in the Amur Basin
Although the economic activity has fallen down on the Russian side, the economic boom on the Chinese side of the border has more than made up for it; efforts are made by the Russian government to revitalize the economy of the region, and the Chinese government as well is implementing plans to boost growth in the Northeast region for domestic political reasons : Beijing is growingly under pressure from the population of inner China to make sure the new wealth witnessed on coastal provinces is spreading into Interior China.
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Extending agriculture and developing new industrial activities imply accrued water use. The region is already experiencing drought that could mean new and significant problems local authorities will have to solve in cross-border talks.
Transportation
While railway and road infrastructure are deficient, river transportation in the 
Agriculture
Besides emerging pressure on water resources from the Amur Basin to quench the thirst of the 3H basin, agriculture growth is already putting pressure on water available in the region. In Northeastern China, agriculture is expanding extensively, acting as a pioneering front designed to increase farmland area to boost production and create employment in a depressed region. After a decline in relative terms during the 1960s, the Chinese government and provincial authorities have designed a plan to transform the Northeast into a vast granary, where farmland expansion could guarantee food production increase. Rice, corn, soybeans, sugarbeets are the main crops, and animal husbandry is also expanding fast. In 1983, the objectives of government officials were to increase the cultivated area by 50%. In 1996, 200 000 ha were in the process of Chine, op. cit., 1998, p.110 The choice of crops definitely has an impact on water use. The region does not suffer from a hot climate, but precipitations are rather low, especially in the Northwest of the area, and very irregular. 53 It is not that the chosen crops by Chinese farmers and
Chinese officials are very water-demanding (except for rice), but their water needs, especially for corn and sugarbeet, are greater than precipitation-brought water : it is thus impossible to develop a totally rainfed agriculture in the newly developed areas of Northeast China (see Annex). As crop cultivation extends, irrigation will also follow suit, with both tubewell irrigation and water irrigation ; it is already representing a sizeable share of cropland in the area, about 15 to 25 % (Map 7 
Industry
Development of border areas with Chinese capital will, in turn, lead to new industries setting up in boom town and increasing their withdrawals, along with urban population in these centers. This trend is gradually unfolding, but it is not so much industrial use that could pose a problem in as much as Heilongjiang province, especially along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, had long being neglected, in part because it was on the front line against a long-time hostile USSR, also because urban centers and capital were located more to the south. The industrial base in Heilongjiang has remained stagnant because of the province's continued dependence on noncompetitive resource-based industries. 
A joint management of the Amur Basin Waters ?
There are only two treaties dealing specifically with the Amur River water management, signed in June 1915 and in August 1956. The latter was aimed at determining the real potential for hydropower generation; the former, interestingly, was primarily concerned with border demarcation but included important specifications about water supply and made provisions for the equal sharing of water to be mobilized after 1915.
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The two countries never considered a binding trinational authority (China, Russia and Mongolia) so as to regulate water use and management in the Amur basin;
nor is the concept of integrated and sustainable management well developed among the region : although the need to rationalize water use is increasingly understood in China, its implementation is slow, and its rationale lies not on the goal of finding an equilibrium so as to reach sustainable development, but so as to maximize the use of water so as to maximize its economic use.
It would be inaccurate, however, to state that cooperation over water 
Conclusion
There still is underlying mistrust between China and Russia. 61 , despite the warming of relations and the development of significant trade relations.
Once a political tool against the Soviet Union during the 1970s, when Chinese propaganda showed maps with derivation projects or the inclusion of the Amur basin into China, the idea of tapping into Siberia's water resources could resurface in China, This evolution of the bilateral relation between China and Russia, on both sides of a once heavily guarded border river, takes place at a time when water resources are increasingly a limiting factor in Chinese development, especially in the North China plain. Agriculture is using water resources there at an unsustainable rate;
industries and cities are competing for a scarcer resource given the increased demand.
The government has so far opted for the derivation of Yangzi water up north. But it is also aware that, if withdrawals levels remain as they are, other derivations will prove necessary because of the depletion of aquifers. Projects already exist, from the Yalu, the Irtish, or the Amur/Heilongjiang basin.
If given the government approval, these projects are likely to trigger a heated debate between riparian countries. As for the Amur, such a derivation project would take place in a region where growth is already straining resources, and where suspicion remains present between the two main riparians, China and Russia.
62 de Villiers, 2000 , pp.313-314. 63 Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, Sino-Russian Relations under Putin, op. cit., March 2000 .
Annex
Crops, evapotranspiration and water needs in North-eastern China A tentative assessment of the rainfed agriculture prospects
There might be data processed by Chinese authorities or academics on crop evapotranspiration in Northeastern China, but it remained not to be found -so far.
Ministry of Agriculture officials would not answer letters asking for such data.
So as to assess water needs for crop development and agricultural activities in the studied area, in the absence of official data, approximate evaluations can be drawn from commonly used formulas established by agronomists. This data can help assess the trends in water needs given the expansion of agricultural activities in Northeastern
China, both in terms of seeded surface and chosen crops.
Methodology
Given the poor level of details found in Chinese meteorological records, I
opted for the Blaney-Criddle formula : However, this formula implies elaborate calculation for which data was lacking. The formula was therefore not used for the present set of calculation.
Chinese meteorological data are difficult to find with long sets of data on a monthly basis. Series were found for a few cities in Northeastern China : Qiqihar, 5,08 12,7 25,4 55,88 93,98 86,36 38,1 10,16 342,9 Note : rice evapotranspiration only reflects ground and leaves evapotranspiration. Paddy rice, with inundated fields, imply much greater water needs so as to keep the crop flooded.
The cultures that can be rainfed are overshadowed in green. When the deficit is less than 15%, the month value is overshadowed in yellow. Not overshadowed values imply an evapotranspiration deficit greater than 15%, implying the need to complement rain with irrigation.
Data analysis :
Rice is for sure a water-demanding crop; so is corn, to a lesser extent.
Although its water needs are spread over a longer growing season, sugarbeet is also demanding similar amounts to corn.
To the contrary, soybean is not very demanding and would seem more adapted to dryer latitudes. Wheat, not calculated in this study, is also a crop that does not require large amounts of water per surface unit -as much as 30% less.
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It then may seem a curious choice to have opted for rice, corn and sugarbeet in rather dry regions.
But the amount of water needed by these crops, given the low temperatures, is not enormous : relative water scarcity for agricultural activities in the Northeast region will not really stem from the development of water-hungry crops such as cotton or tomato, but rather from the sheer extension of cultivated fields. Data shows precipitation levels are so low that irrigation is quite often needed to complement, sometimes heavily, crop cultivation in the area, the more so as cultivation is expanding up north and west. Results do show relying only on rain to grow crops is nearly impossible in Qiqihar and Hailar, but more so in Shenyang, underlining the decreasing precipitation gradient from the Southeast to the Northwest. There will be a clear correlation between crop extension and water need, which can be satisfied either with river irrigation or aquifer pumping. Given the low level of precipitation, it is doubtful replenishment of aquifers is fast : pumping will thus alter aquifer levels and encourage irrigation with water pumped from rivers in the Ussuri and Sungari watersheds.
Water flows are large in the Amur basin; but growing needs in Northeastern China may soon begin to alter basin-wide water availability.
68 R. Bouillot, Hydraulique agricole et urbaine, Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble, tome 1, 1976, p.97.
